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The Error-Related Negativity (Ne or ERN) is a reliable electrophysiological index of error
processing, which has been found to be independent of whether a subject is aware of
an error or not. A large Ne was equally seen after errors that were consciously detected
(Aware errors) and those that were not (Unaware errors), compared to a small negativity
for correct responses (CRN). This suggests a dissociation between an automatic,
preconscious error processing mechanism and subjective evaluation. A common concern
regarding this finding is that subjects could have been somewhat aware of their errors, but
did not report them due to lack of confidence. Here we tested this possibility directly using
a betting paradigm which allowed us to separate occasions in which the subjects were
confident of their response and trials in which they were unsure. In a choice reaction time
task, subjects directly judged the accuracy of each response (correct or error) and then bet
on this judgment using a high, medium, or low amount of money. The bets were used to
determine the level of confidence the subjects had of their response. The average across
all subjects regardless of confidence (betting) measure replicated the reported finding of
an equal Ne for Aware and Unaware errors which was larger than the CRN. However, when
Ne measurement was confined to high confidence (high bet) trials in confident subjects, a
prominent Ne was seen only for Aware errors, while confident Unaware errors (i.e., error
trials on which subjects made high bets that they were correct) elicited a response that did
not differ from the CRN elicited by truly correct answers. In contrast, for low confidence
trials in unconfident subjects, an intermediate and equal Ne/CRN was elicited by Correct
responses, Aware and Unaware errors. These results provide direct evidence that the
Ne is related to error awareness, and suggest the amplitude of the Ne/CRN depends on
individual differences in error reporting and confidence.
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INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, we are sometimes acutely aware of having made
an error (the notorious “oops” sensation), but at other times we
are oblivious of our errors (e.g., when we make typographical
errors). In many cases, effective performance of a task requires
that errors will be promptly detected and swiftly corrected (e.g.,
driving or machine operation). Understanding the conditions
that lead to error awareness is important for understanding the
executive functions that guide goal-directed activity and learn-
ing. One of the most intriguing questions in the area of error
awareness is why some errors reach awareness while others stay
unnoticed. Yet before this question can be answered, it is cru-
cial to determine whether unnoticed errors are processed as errors
at all. Using electrophysiology, it has repeatedly been shown that
errors in various tasks and modalities are processed as errors by
the brain even if we are unaware of making them (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005, 2007; O’Connell et al., 2007, 2009;
Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi et al., 2009; Dhar et al., 2011; Hughes
and Yeung, 2011). In each of these studies, awareness of errors
was reported on a single trial basis, and a large Error-Related
Negativity (Ne; Falkenstein et al., 1991; or ERN; Gehring et al.,
1993), a fronto-central ERP component locked to the incorrect
response, was equally seen after errors that were reported (Aware
errors) and those that weren’t (Unaware errors). In most cases, a
much smaller response-locked negativity was elicited by correct
responses (Correct-Related Negativity, CRN; Ford, 1999; Vidal
et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2001). In contrast to the insensitivity
of the Ne to awareness, a later centro-parietal Error Positivity
wave (Pe; Falkenstein et al., 1991) was elicited only after Aware
errors. Two additional event-related fMRI studies by Hester et al.
(2005) and Klein et al. (2007) further supported these findings
by showing that the Anterior-Cingulate region associated with
the generation of the Ne (Dehaene et al., 1994; Brazdil et al.,
2002; Debener et al., 2005) does not show a difference between
Aware and Unaware errors (see also Stemmer et al., 2004), while
Aware errors only were associated with larger bilateral activation
of prefrontal and parietal regions (Hester et al., 2005) or left ante-
rior Insula activity (Klein et al., 2007). These findings led to the
widespread notion that error monitoring, as reflected by the Ne,
goes on regardless of conscious awareness of making errors (e.g.,
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Simons, 2009). However, findings from a handful of studies that
showed that the Newas smaller for ostensibly unaware errors raise
doubts regarding whether the Ne is truly insensitive to awareness.
Maier et al. (2008, Experiment 2), using a masked Flanker task,
and Steinhauser and Yeung (2010), using a brightness discrimi-
nation task, both asked subjects to judge their own accuracy on
a single-trial basis, and found a larger Ne for Aware than for
Unaware errors. Woodman (2010) used a visual-search task in
which in some trials the targets were rendered invisible by sub-
stitution masking. Although the participants were not required to
indicate awareness of their errors, errors in masked-target trials
were assumed to be Unaware errors because the participants were
at chance in detecting the presence of the target. An Ne was gen-
erated only by errors committed during the non-masked trials,
even though masked targets also attracted attention, as evidenced
by the N2pc component. Praamstra et al. (2003) induced errors
in a cued tapping task by small or large shifts (15 or 50ms) in
the cue timing. While they also did not require their subjects to
report awareness of an error, they assumed that the small shifts
are below perception threshold whereas the large shifts are con-
sciously detected. Since only large shifts were followed by an Ne,
the results were once again taken to suggest that awareness of the
errors is a prerequisite for Ne elicitation.
A major critique for the experiments that showed that the Ne
was independent of conscious awareness pertains to the deter-
mination of the level of error awareness. Were subjects really
unaware of the error or was their criterion for reporting an error
too high? This criterion may be influenced by individual tenden-
cies, as well as by task instructions and demand characteristics
artifacts. If subjects are in fact under-reporting their awareness,
the Unaware Error bin could be contaminated by (unreported)
Aware errors which have a larger Ne, leading to an inflated Ne for
Unaware errors.
This possibility was in fact directly addressed by Scheffers and
Coles (2000) who used certainty ratings instead of error-reporting
on a trial-by-trial basis. Their subjects performed a Flanker task
and immediately afterwards had to indicate their confidence on
a five-point scale from “sure correct,” through “don’t know,” to
“sure incorrect.” The size of the Ne depended on the subjective
confidence of making an error. These results have recently been
replicated by Hewig et al. (2011) and suggest that the Ne is an
index of subjective, rather than objective error monitoring. This
conjecture is supported by studies which used indirect measure
of error certainty, such as post-test questionnaires and reaction
times (RTs), under the assumption that slower responses indi-
cate uncertainty (Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004a; Wessel et al.,
2011). All the above studies that measured the Pe component
(Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010; Woodman, 2010; Hewig et al.,
2011;Wessel et al., 2011), found that it was larger for Aware errors
than Unaware errors. Taken together, these studies support the
premise that the Ne, like the Pe, is an index of subjective error
processing. They contradict a large body of evidence (including
our own, Shalgi et al., 2009 and Shalgi and Deouell, 2010) that
showed no effect of awareness on the Ne.
Here, we directly addressed this contradiction by using a
paradigm in which we previously found a similar Ne for Aware
and Unaware errors (Shalgi and Deouell, 2010), together with a
wagering paradigm (see Ullsperger et al., 2010) which was shown
to be amore objective measure of awareness then direct introspec-
tion (Persaud et al., 2007). Instead of directly asking participants
to assess their own certainty, the subjects are required to make
a bet of a small, medium, or large amount of money on their
accuracy judgment (rather than on the actual response). If the
participants’ decision about their accuracy is correct, they win this
money; otherwise, they lose it. The optimal strategy is to bet high
whenever they feel they are not just guessing. In other words, par-
ticipants are willing “to put their money where their mouth is”
(Koch and Preuschoff, 2007). In the current study, we employed
this betting paradigm to separate trials in which the participants
were sure of their response from trials in which they were unsure
without explicitly asking for confidence ratings. We expected that
if the Ne is indeed independent of awareness, it should be elicited
even when the subjects are highly confident that they are right.
Conversely, if Ne is only elicited by Aware errors, it should be
eliminated if subjects are confident that they had not made an
error.
To summarize, previous studies suggested that the Ne is inde-
pendent from error awareness, while other findings showed that
the Ne is affected by subjective confidence. We aimed to repli-
cate both findings in the same experiment, with better confidence
assessment, in order to explain the discrepancy between the
former studies.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
SUBJECTS
The participants were 22 students (14 males, all right handed as a
prerequisite due to the lateralized aspect of the task), aged 23–32
(mean = 25.73, SD = 2.7), with reportedly normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and no history of neurological disorders. Two
additional subjects were tested but were excluded from analysis;
one due to a very small number of Unaware errors (see “Analysis
of Behavior”) and the other due to a misunderstanding of task
instructions. All students were paid a minimum flat fee or given
course credits for their participation in the study. In addition, they
could make up to an extra 25 NIS (∼7$, the equivalent of lunch
at the campus cafeteria) by wagering correctly on their responses
in the experiment (see “Procedure”), but they could never lose
money (i.e., get less than the minimum fee). Written consent was
obtained after the experimental procedures were explained. The
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of
Social Science at the Hebrew University.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
Participants sat in a dimly lit, sound attenuated and echo-reduced
chamber (Eckel C-26, UK). Stimuli included seven white shapes
(diamond, triangle, pentagon, parallelogram, trapezoid, circle,
pie) of four different sizes (subtending visual angles of 1.2◦–1.8◦)
on a gray background, presented on a Viewsonic G75f CRT
monitor, 100 cm from the subjects’ eyes. A row of three shapes
appeared on every trial (see Figure 1). The lateral shapes and the
central shape were never the same size. Shapes were spaced 5.08◦
apart. A cushioned tray was placed on the subjects’ lap. On the
right of the tray was a two-button response box with the buttons
“YES” and “NO,” their side counterbalanced across participants.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 124 | 2
Shalgi and Deouell Awareness affects the error negativity
FIGURE 1 | The trial procedure and some example trials.
On the left was a computer mouse used to make the secondary
responses (see “Procedure”).
PROCEDURE
We developed the Lateralized Error Awareness Task (LEAT) to
enable the separation of left and right errors and to obtain an
awareness index of each error (Shalgi and Deouell, 2010). The
LEAT is a manual choice-reaction time task in which participants
are presented with three horizontally aligned shapes in each trial.
In the primary task, the participants are instructed to press the
“YES” button if one of the shapes is a designated target shape
(Shape target), or if one of the lateral shapes (left or right) is the
same shape as the central shape (Matching target), disregarding
shape sizes, and to press the “NO” button otherwise.
A small black fixation cross appeared constantly at the center
of the screen. Each trial started with the three shapes presented
for 120ms. Four hundred milliseconds after their disappearance,
the color of the central fixation changed from black to light gray.
The participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible
only once the fixation had changed its color, creating a response
delay in order to increase the number of Unaware errors (see
Shalgi et al., 2007). There was no time limit on the response,
so participants were forced to make a choice in each trial, but if
their RT was longer than 1320ms, a screen was displayed which
reminded the participants to respond when the color of the fix-
ation changes. Shape presentation time was too short to allow
lateral eye movements; participants were required to fixate on
the central cross and were advised that this will allow for best
performance.
Five to seven hundred milliseconds after the primary response,
an “Accuracy Judgment” screen appeared in which the choice
the participant had just made (“YES” or “NO”) was displayed,
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together with two on-screen buttons labeled “Correct” and
“Error,” and the participant had to click one of the buttons
using the mouse controlled with their left hand. The left hand
was used for mouse responses as the right (dominant) hand
was always kept on the response box for the primary speeded
response. Immediately after the participants made their judg-
ment, a “Betting” screen appeared which informed the partici-
pant of the judgment they had just made (“Correct” or “Error”)
and asked them to bet on this decision by clicking the mouse on
one of three credits: 1 (small bet), 2 (medium bet), or 3 (high bet).
The participants were not told how much money each credit was
worth, only that a larger number of credits meantmoremoney (as
an added incentive, an image of a small, medium, or large money
bag was displayed beside each credit amount, see Figure 1). The
participants were told that if they had made a correct accuracy
judgment they would win the number of credits they had bet
on, but in case of an incorrect accuracy judgment they would
lose that same amount. Both the Accuracy Judgment and the
Betting screens were displayed until the participants made their
choice. The black fixation cross stayed on constantly during these
screens. After placing a bet, the fixation screen was displayed for
800–1000ms, followed by the next trial.
Each block consisted of 88 trials, of which 44 were target trials
(50%), equally divided between Shape andMatching targets. Each
target shape or matching shape appeared equally on the left or on
the right (the target shape never appeared as the central shape).
The order of the stimuli was randomized across participants. To
complicate the task and elicit more errors, every 22 trials (i.e.,
four times per block), a different shape (one of the seven possi-
ble shapes at random) was designated as the Shape target, using
a screen that announced the change and displayed the new tar-
get shape at the center of the screen for two seconds. Each block
lasted approximately six minutes. The results of each block were
not displayed to the participants so they could not use them to
change or adjust their strategy.
Two practice blocks of 15 trials each preceded the experiment,
both with neither the Accuracy judgment screen nor the Betting
screen. In the first practice, the participants were introduced only
to the Matching targets in order to acquaint them with the differ-
ent shapes and sizes and to gradually ease them into the task. In
the second practice, the Shape target condition was introduced.
When the participants were confident in their understanding of
the task, they performed 16 consecutive experimental blocks. Due
to the length of the experiment, after eight blocks the participants
were taken out of the recording chamber for a 5–10minute rest,
without removing the electrode cap.
Following the testing session, participants filled a question-
naire in which they rated task difficulty and estimated their own
accuracy. The amount of credits won at the end of the experiment
was converted to cash using a pre-formed conversion table.
ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR
Errors judged as “Error” in the Accuracy Judgment screen were
considered Aware errors, and Errors judged as “Correct” were
considered Unaware errors. Correct responses judged as “Error”
were classified as False Errors. The percentage of False Errors for
each participant was very low, ranging between 0.1–6% (mean
2.1%, SD 1.6%), and therefore, this type of error was not further
analyzed. Trials with primary RTs faster than 50ms or slower than
2500ms were excluded from analysis. Accuracy was calculated
separately for each bet category (1, 2, or 3). Error Awareness rate
was calculated as the number of Aware errors divided by the total
number of errors. RTs were calculated across blocks separately for
the different response types and for the different bet categories
(there were not enough error trials to divide response type by bet).
The different measures were compared separately using repeated
measures ANOVAs. Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied
when necessary and the uncorrected degrees of freedom are pre-
sented along with the Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon where it was
<1 (Picton et al., 2000). Contrasts were performed using paired
sample t-tests.
EEG RECORDING
EEG was recorded continuously with Ag/AgCl electrodes from 64
scalp electrodes, left and right mastoid sites, and the tip of the
nose, using a BioSemi Active 2 system (Biosemi, Netherlands).
Blinks and eye movements were monitored using four additional
EOG electrodes located at the outer canthus of the right and
left eyes and above and below the center of the right eye. The
EEG was continuously sampled at 512Hz and stored for off-line
analysis. Analsyis was conducted using BrainVision Analyzer 2
(Brain Products, Germany), andMatlabR2011a (TheMathWorks
Inc., Natick, MA). For two participants, data from one malfunc-
tioning electrode (P3 or CP3) was replaced by using spherical
spline interpolation (Perrin et al., 1989; Perrin, 1990, imple-
mented by Analyzer 2). The EEG data was digitally referenced to
the nose and filtered with a bandpass of 0.5–20Hz (zero-phase
24 dB/octave Butterworth filter). Blink artifacts were removed
using the Independent Component Analysis (ICA) method (Jung
et al., 2000; as implemented in Analyzer 2). Note that although we
corrected for blink artifacts, we first verified that the participants
did not blink during stimulus presentation. This was the case
for all subjects and trials, with negligible exceptions. Segments
contaminated by other artifacts were discarded (rejection crite-
ria: >100μV absolute difference between samples within seg-
ments of 100ms; absolute amplitude beyond the±100μV range).
Artifact-free EEG data was parsed into 900ms response-locked
segments starting 400ms before the response. An average of
93.6% segments survived artifact rejection (range per partic-
ipant, per response type 75.7–100%). The inclusion criterion
was at least 20 Unaware Error segments which survived artifact
rejection.
Response-locked segments were averaged separately for
Correct responses, Aware errors, and Unaware errors, and within
each category for bets 1 and 3. The 2 (medium) bet was excluded
from analysis as it was only used to get a cleaner measure of the
participants’ confidence in the 1 and 3 bet bins. By including this
bet option, we could be more confident that when participants
chose to bet on 1 they were unsure of their decision and when
they chose to bet on 3 they were confident, as all the intermediate
cases would fall into the 2 bin. Potentials were measured relative
to a 400–200ms pre-response baseline period (O’Connell et al.,
2007; Shalgi et al., 2009). This baseline period did not include the
immediate pre-response period as the neural activity leading to
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the response naturally starts earlier than the final motor outcome
of the button press.
ERP ANALYSIS
The Error Negativity: The Ne amplitude and latency were
detected individually for each participant and each subcategory
andmeasured in the response-locked averages as the mean ampli-
tude ±4ms around the most negative peak at the interval of
0–150ms post-response at electrode FCz.
The Error Positivity: As the Pe is a more sustained parietal
wave, it was pre-defined based on our previous studies as the
average amplitude at electrode Pz between 300 and 500ms post
response in the response locked averages. Since inspection of the
grand average waveforms (see Figure 3) suggested that the Pe
began at around 200ms, we also performed all analyses of the
Pe on the 200–500ms timeframe, and obtained the same quali-
tative results. Therefore, only the results of the first analysis will
be reported.
To simulate traditional procedures, the Ne and Pe ampli-
tudes were entered separately into One-Way repeated measures
ANOVAs for Response Type (Correct, Aware Error, Unaware
Error), across all subjects and bets. Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rection was applied where necessary. Contrasts were performed
using paired sample t-tests.
The cardinal question of this study was whether the Ne is
affected by awareness when subjects are highly confident of being
aware or unaware of making an error. To that end, we isolated
the group of 12 participants who had enough (defined a-priori
as more than 20 EEG segments available for analysis) Aware and
Unaware error trials with bet 3, and repeated the above One-
Way ANOVA analysis with bet 3 trials only. A similar analysis
for bet 1 responses was conducted for those eight subjects who
had enough Aware and Unaware errors with bet 1. Three sub-
jects were included in both groups, four participants did not have
enough segments to be included in any group and one participant
was excluded from this analysis due to noisy data (see “Analysis of
the Response-Locked Waveforms After Subtracting the Stimulus-
locked Waveform” in Appendix for the number of trials in each
group).
Hardly any subjects bet enough on both 1 and 3 for both
Aware and Unaware errors to allow a full within subject analysis.
Therefore, in order to compare the awareness effect between con-
fident and less confident subjects, we omitted the three subjects
who were included in both groups above from the high confi-
dence group, which now included only those nine subjects who
had enough bet 3 errors of both types but less than 20 bet 1 errors.
The Ne and Pe of theHigh Confidence (HiC) and LowConfidence
(LoC) groups were then compared across all bets using a mixed
ANOVA with Group as the between-subject factor and Response
Type as the within-subject factor. Contrasts were performed using
independent-samples t-tests.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Accuracy and error awareness
The behavioral results are summarized in Figure 2. Although the
subjects rated the task as relatively difficult (mean 3.6/5, SD 0.85),
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results of all 22 participants.
accuracy in the task was quite high (85.9%, SD 4.6%). Overall
awareness of errors was 50.1% (SD 14.7%).
Overall, bet 3 was the popular bet (67.9%), followed by bet
2 (19.6%), and finally bet 1 (12.3%). Rational calculations pre-
dict that due to the high accuracy in the task, a strategy of always
betting on 3 would yield the highest result, and participants
might have intuitively made this assumption. Figure 2B describes
the betting patterns for the different response types. When the
participants were correct, they were usually certain about their
answer (bet 3). Uncertainty went up with the different types of
errors: when participants made an Aware Error they tended to
bet less on 3 than when they were correct, and even less so when
they made an Unaware error. They were least certain when they
(rarely) mistakenly judged a correct response as an error. Primary
response accuracies for the three bet categories were 52.8% (SD
12.4) for bet 1, 75.1% (SD 12.2) for bet 2 and 91.1% (SD 4) for
bet 3 [F(2, 38) = 152.9, p < 0.001, ε = 0.95]; two subjects were
excluded from this analysis as they did not have any bet 2 or
any bet 1 choices. Accuracy for bet 1 was lower than for bet 2
[t(19) = 10.55, p < 0.001], which was in turn lower than the
accuracy for bet 3 [t(19) = 7.89, p < 0.001].
Reaction times
Reaction times in this task were relatively long (across bets:
Correct responses 814.7ms, SD 42.8; Aware errors 885.8ms, SD
64; Unaware errors 889ms, SD 64.9) due to the task instruc-
tions to delay responses until the fixation changed its color.
Nevertheless, the RTs depended on accuracy [F(2, 42) = 54.67,
p < 0.001, ε = 0.98] as the RTs for Correct responses were shorter
than those for errors [t(21) = 11.34, p < 0.001]; there was no
difference between RTs for Aware and Unaware errors p = 0.71.
There was also a significant difference between RTs of responses
followed by the different bet categories [F(2, 38) = 66.61, p <
0.001, ε = 0.99]: RTs followed by bet 1 (952.2ms, SD = 84.9)
were significantly longer than RTs followed by bet 2 [885ms,
SD = 98.1; t(19) = 5.47, p < 0.001] and these in turn were sig-
nificantly longer than RTs followed by bet 3 [796.9ms SD = 41.4;
t(20) = 6.33, p < 0.001]. This supports the assumption that par-
ticipants bet on 1 when they were less confident of their response
(slower RTs due to hesitation) and on 3 when they were confident.
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FIGURE 3 | Grand average (N = 22) response-locked ERPs to correct and error responses across all bets at electrode (A) FCz and (B) Pz. The bottom
panel shows the scalp topography at the time of (A) the CRN/Ne peak and (B) the Pe.
Debriefing
Upon debriefing in the post-test questionnaire, all participants
noted they made their bets according to their level of certainty.
Taken together with the behavioral results, we can be quite sure
that each bet category corresponds to a certainty rating.
ERP RESULTS
Awareness effects regardless of confidence
Replicating the results of traditional studies not assessing con-
fidence, a clear Ne was elicited across subjects and bets by
both Aware and Unaware errors, beginning before the response
and peaking after the response (Figure 3A). A CRN can be
seen at about the same time for Correct responses. A sig-
nificant effect in a One-Way repeated measures ANOVA for
Response Type was found for the Ne amplitude [F(2, 42) = 10.2,
p < 0.001, ε = 0.959]. This stemmed from a difference between
errors and Correct responses [t(21) = 4.57, p < 0.001] while
there was no difference between the Ne amplitude for Aware
and Unaware errors [t(21) = 1.79, p = 0.09]. Note that while
the peak-to-trough CRN seems to be around the same size or
even larger than the Ne, supplementary analysis (see “Analysis of
the Response-locked Waveforms After Subtracting the Stimulus-
locked Waveform” in Appendix) which corrected for the over-
lapping effect of the stimulus-locked P3, revealed that the CRN
is indeed smaller than the Ne. Figure 3B illustrates the results
at electrode Pz, where the Pe can be seen as the slow positivity
following the response for Aware errors only. A significant effect
in a One-Way repeated measures ANOVA for Response Type
was found for the Pe amplitude [F(2, 42) = 35.32, p < 0.001, ε =
0.82], which stemmed from the difference between Aware errors
and Correct responses [t(21) = 6.67, p < 0.001] and the differ-
ence between Aware errors and Unaware errors [t(21) = 6.47,
p < 0.001].
Awareness effects with confident accuracy judgments
The most critical question in our study is whether awareness
affects the Ne when subjects are highly confident of having made
an error or highly confident that they have not made one, as
indicated by their willingness to put a high bet on this decision.
Note that when participants make an error and bet the high-
est bet on having made one, they are confident that an error
has been made, that is, they demonstrate high error awareness.
Similarly, when subjects place the highest bet on having made
a correct response, when in fact they have committed an error,
they demonstrate clear unawareness of the error. Thus, we iso-
lated 12 subjects who had enough bet 3 trials for both Aware and
Unaware errors (see “Methods”), and measured the Ne and Pe
for their bet 3 trials only. Contrary to the previous results, the Ne
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FIGURE 4 | Effect of confidence on response-locked ERPs at electrodes FCz and Pz, when only high (A) or low (B) bets are averaged.
was larger for Aware errors than for Unaware errors, and Unaware
errors did not differ from Correct responses (Figure 4A), main
effect: [F(2, 22) = 8.65, p < 0.005, ε = 0.77], Aware errors vs.
Unaware errors: [t(11) = 3.26, p < 0.01], Corrects vs. Unaware
errors: [t(11) = 0.42, p = 0.68]. Thus, when only clear cases of
subjective error awareness or unawareness are taken into consid-
eration, the Ne is found to be strongly affected by error awareness.
The Pe too was large only for Aware errors in the bet 3 trials in this
group [F(2, 22) = 20.35, p < 0.001, ε = 0.67], Correct Responses
vs. Aware errors: [t(11) = 4.67, p < 0.005], Aware vs. Unaware:
[t(11) = 5.36, p < 0.001]. Thus, both the Ne and the Pe are larger
for Aware errors when subjects are confident of their awareness.
Awareness effects with low-confidence accuracy judgments
To examine the awareness effect when subjects are not sure about
their performance, we isolated eight subjects who had enough
bet 1 trials for both Aware and Unaware errors (see “Methods”),
and measured the Ne and Pe for their bet 1 trials only. When
subjects were only willing to place the lowest possible bet on
their decision, we surmise that they were not sure of whether
they had made an error or not. In other words, they may have
had only a trace of awareness of an error when they had made
one, and conversely may have had some trace of awareness of
an error even if one had not been committed. Indeed, the Ne
and Pe were similar for all responses—Correct, Aware errors, and
Unaware errors (Figure 4B), [Ne: F(2, 14) < 1, p = 0.47, ε = 0.67;
Pe: F(2, 14) = 2.77, p = 0.13, ε = 0.6]. This finding supports the
notion that the Ne is affected by the level of subjective error
awareness.
Since there were many Correct responses with both bets in
this group of subjects, we could directly compare between bet 1
and bet 3. “Analysis of the Correct Response-locked Waveforms
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of the Low Confidence Group After Subtracting the Stimulus-
locked Waveform”in Appendix shows the CRN and Pe of Correct
responses for the two bets after correcting for the overlapping
effect of the stimulus locked P3. The difference between the
CRN for bet 1 and bet 3 was significant [t(7) = 2.38, p < 0.05].
However, the Pe for Correct responses did not significantly differ
between bet 1 and 3 [t(7) = 1, p = 0.35].
Direct comparison between low and high confidence groups
As noted in the methods section, the number of errors in each
response-type and bet precluded a complete within-subject analy-
sis of high and low bets. However, we could compare high and low
confidence subjects, collapsing across their bets (see “Methods”).
For this analysis, high confidence subjects were those nine sub-
jects who had made enough bet 3 aware and unaware errors but
few (<20) bet 1 errors (HiC group), while low confidence subjects
were the eight subjects who had enough bet 1 aware and unaware
errors (LoC group). As the groups did not overlap, they could be
compared directly (Table 1, Figures 5 and 6). The groups differed
significantly in primary task accuracy [t(15) = 2.88, p < 0.05]
but not in error awareness rates [t(15) = 1.16, p = 0.26] or sub-
jective rating of task difficulty [t(15) = 1.2, p = 0.25]. As may
be expected by the group division criteria, the betting patterns
of the groups (Figure 5) were significantly different; a significant
main effect of the within-subject factor Bet was moderated by
an interaction with the between-subject factor Group in a mixed
ANOVA [main effect: F(2, 30) = 28.7, p < 0.001, ε = 0.71; inter-
action: F(2, 30) = 6.98, p < 0.01]. The interaction stemmed from
different usage of the 1 and 3 bets between groups.
Figure 6 shows a dramatic effect of confidence in the
Ne period. While the Ne for Unaware errors aligns with the
Ne for Aware errors in the LoC group, there is practically no
Ne for Unaware errors in the HiC group. That is, the response
for Unaware errors is similar to the CRN elicited by Correct
responses. A mixed ANOVA with the within factor Response
Type and between factor Group for the Ne amplitude con-
firmed these results, showing a significant effect of Response
Type [F(2, 30) = 8.8, p < 0.005, ε = 0.95] which was moderated
by a significant interaction [F(2, 30) = 3.55, p < 0.05]. To eluci-
date this interaction, we compared the Ne amplitude between
groups separately for each response type. There was no significant
difference between the Ne for Correct responses [t(15) = 0.77,
Table 1 | Comparison of the behavioral results of the High and Low
Confidence Groups.
High Confidence Low Confidence P-value
(N = 9) (N = 8)
Accuracy 87.9% (4%) 82.5% (3.65%) 0.011∗
Awareness 51.9% (11%) 45% (12.9%) 0.264
Difficulty rating 3.33 (1.12) 3.87 (0.64) 0.248
RT 833.4 (19.95) 823.5 (52.83) 0.074
%Bet 1 5.92% (4.5%) 22.39% (18.2%) 0.019∗
%Bet 2 12.61 (9.6%) 27.96% (20.95%) 0.066
%Bet 3 81.21 (13.9%) 49.41% (29.2%) 0.01∗
∗p < 0.05.
FIGURE 5 | Proportion of each bet category for each response type for
the High and Low Confidence groups.
p = 0.45] or for Aware errors [t(15) = 0.12, p = 0.9], but there
was a significantly larger Ne for Unaware errors in the LoC group
compared to the HiC group [t(15) = 2.26, p < 0.05].
The same mixed ANOVA for the amplitude of the Pe showed
a significant effect of Response Type [F(2, 30) = 23.91, p < 0.001,
ε = 0.81] but no interaction [F(2, 30) < 1, p = 0.98]. Follow-up
contrasts on the main effect of Response Type revealed a differ-
ence between the Pe for Aware and Unaware errors [t(15) = 5.21,
p < 0.001] and no difference between the Pe for Correct and
Unaware errors [t(15) = 1.75, p = 0.1].
DISCUSSION
Optimizing goal-directed behavior in imperfect conditions likely
relies on both implicit and explicit error detection processes. In
order to understand the unique contribution of each type of pro-
cess, an essential initial step is to find physiological indices of
aware and unaware error processing. Previous research linked
the Ne component, occurring within the first 100ms after the
response, to processing of errors independent of conscious-
ness, while awareness of errors influenced the amplitude of the
Pe component at latencies longer than 250ms post-response
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005, 2007; O’Connell
et al., 2007, 2009; Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi et al., 2009; Dhar
et al., 2011; Hughes and Yeung, 2011). This was based on the
finding that an Ne was similarly elicited whether subjects were
aware of making an error or not, while a large Pe was restricted to
errors of which the subjects were aware. Here, we replicated this
result across subjects in a new visual choice-reaction time task.
A significant Ne was elicited both by errors the subjects reported
(Aware errors) and by errors the subjects did not report (Unaware
errors). However, awareness is not necessarily a binary situation,
and subjects may differ in their criterion for reporting awareness.
That is, some subjects may not report awareness of an error even
if they have some notion of making one, but are not absolutely
sure. In this situation, some putative unaware errors would be
contaminated with “partial awareness,” and the elicitation of Ne
for these errors would not be evidence for processing of errors
without awareness.
In an attempt to get a stricter selection of unaware errors
and clarify this question, we used a wagering paradigm, asking
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FIGURE 6 | Effect of confidence on response-locked ERPs at electrodes FCz and Pz. (A) High confidence group (B) Low confidence group. (C) The
interaction between Group and Response Type.
subjects to indicate not only whether they had made an error or
not, but also to bet money on their answer to this question. The
pivotal working assumption was that if subjects report that they
have not made an error (when one was made) yet they have some
awareness that an error might have been committed, they would
be reluctant to bet a large sum of money on their report. Indeed,
subjects’ debriefing, as well as RTs, suggest that they placed their
bets based on their confidence. Based on this working hypoth-
esis, the critical question was whether an Ne would be elicited
when subjects were confident that they had not made an error,
so much that they were willing to risk losing money. That is, in a
condition mitigating the risk of partial awareness. The answer to
this question was clear: when participants were highly confident
that they had made an error (as indicated by a high bet), a large
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Ne was elicited, but when they were highly confident that they
did not make an Error, the Ne was comparable to the CRN. That
is, there was no indication of error processing without awareness
in this case. On the other hand, subjects who were more hesi-
tant about their accuracy-judgment responses had an equal Ne
for Aware and Unaware errors.
Thus, under stricter selection of Unaware errors, our results
support the premise that the Ne is related to subjective awareness
of an error. Unlike previous studies that showed this effect (e.g.,
Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Hewig et al., 2011), our findings can-
not be explained by the difficulty of performing the task, i.e., of
making mistakes rather than slips (Reason, 1990). Mistakes are
errors in which the participant cannot solve the task, for example,
when representation of the stimulus is degraded, or when the task
is too cognitively demanding, and therefore, a correct response
representation cannot be accurately formed. Slips are errors in
which the correct response representation can be (easily) evoked,
yet an error is made due to premature responding or a momen-
tary lack of attention to the task (Shalgi et al., 2007). Defined this
way, if errors are made due to mistakes, no error processing can
be expected a-priori, as the correct response is unknown. Thus,
the lack of Ne for Unaware errors in Scheffers and Coles (2000;
who used reduced stimulus quality) and in Hewig et al. (2011;
who used a digit entering task, which relies on a participant’s
digit span) studies could be attributed to the possibility that errors
were of the mistake kind. This possibility is reduced in our current
task, as the stimuli were clearly presented and accuracy in the task
was high (>85%). The current results, therefore, strengthens the
notion that the Ne is related to subjective awareness of an error
rather than to error processing per se.
The current results go beyond this conclusion to explain the
source of difference between studies that show no awareness effect
on the Ne (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005, 2007;
O’Connell et al., 2007, 2009; Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi et al.,
2009; Dhar et al., 2011; Hughes and Yeung, 2011) and the studies
that show such an effect (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Praamstra
et al., 2003; Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004a; Maier et al., 2008;
Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010;Woodman, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011;
Wessel et al., 2011). As described above, when we separated our
subjects to high and low confidence groups, we obtained both
results, depending on individual subjects’ error reporting ten-
dencies: across all bets (which parallels the standard procedure
for Ne calculation), there was a strong Ne error awareness effect
for high confidence subjects, but not for low confidence subjects.
Error-reporting experiments likely include a mixture of subjects
who are more confident about their performance in the task (i.e.,
have less instances of partial awareness) and subjects who are
less confident. When a large enough group of subjects is unsure
about their own accuracy, both the Aware Error and the Unaware
Error bins are contaminated by trials that belong to the other bin.
A reported error, labeled “Aware,” might be accompanied by a
relatively low level of awareness, lowering the average Ne of the
Aware errors bin, while an unreported error, labeled “Unaware,”
may in fact be accompanied by some awareness and therefore add
to the average amplitude of the Unaware errors bin. Consequently,
the grand average results, which do not take into account these
individual error-reporting differences may not show a significant
Ne awareness effect. Indeed, as noted also by Wessel et al. (2011),
several previous studies which did not report a statistically signif-
icant difference between the Ne to Aware and Unaware errors, did
show a numerically smaller Ne in the latter case, as we also show
here in the grand average across all subjects and bets. Moreover,
we would assume that in difficult tasks, in which the confidence
about response accuracy is lower for all subjects compared to their
confidence in an easier task, we would be less likely to obtain an
Ne awareness effect, as more trials are expected to be in the “gray
zone” of awareness.
Error awareness has previously been ascribed mainly to the Pe.
Indeed, the Pe, and not the Ne, has already been used to exam-
ine the incidence of error awareness in patient studies (Jonkman
et al., 2007; Larson and Perlstein, 2009; O’Connell et al., 2009;
Wiersema et al., 2009). Our study replicates the sensitivity of the
Pe to awareness of errors: Aware errors elicit a higher sustained
positivity around 300ms post-response. In what we see as the crit-
ical condition, in which subjects were highly confident of their
decision, the Pe for Unaware errors could not be differentiated
from the response elicited in Correct trials, as was the case for the
Ne. That is, bothNe and Pe were elicited only by Aware errors. The
results from the less confident subjects are less clear, however. Like
the case of the Ne, the Pe awareness effect was not significant for
low bets. Yet unlike in the case of the Ne, the interaction between
the high and low confidence groups and error awareness was not
significant for the Pe. Also, although one could surmise that for
Correct responses with low confidence some Pe would emerge
(reflecting some level of false error awareness), no significant dif-
ference was found between correct answers followed by bet 1 and
3 in this group (Figure A2D). Since in all previous studies of error
awareness, in which a mix of confident and less confident subjects
must have been included, a Pe awareness effect was nevertheless
found, we can conjecture that the Pe awareness effect reflects a
more binary decision regarding the error, whereas the Ne is more
sensitive to the level of confidence. We previously proposed that
the Pe may not even be a truly response-locked component, but
a manifestation of a delayed evaluation (reflected by a P3b) of
the stimulus preceding the response (Shalgi et al., 2009). The
continuation of that inquiry will be reported elsewhere.
The main shortcoming of our study, like the studies of
Scheffers and Coles (2000) and Hewig et al. (2011), is the diffi-
culty of directly comparing between bet 1 and bet 3 responses in
the same subjects. Although all our subjects made use of the full
range of the betting scale, only three subjects out of 22 (13.6%)
made enough 1 and 3 bets for both Aware and Unaware errors. A
much larger pool of subjects would have been required to find
a substantial group with enough error trials for within-subject
comparisons. This obstacle, may suggest in fact that some indi-
viduals tend to either be mostly confident about their responses
or mostly unsure of them. One might argue that the confidence
report, as reflected by the bets, is not really related to differ-
ences in the level of error awareness between the subjects, but
rather reflects subjects’ tendency to be more decisive or daring
when making their bets, or their perceived demand characteris-
tics. However, we argue that if this were the case, we would not
have found the dissociation we report here at the time window of
the Ne (i.e., when the response was made), between high and low
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confident subjects, and between high and low bets. It would be
interesting to study what other traits these individual differences
correlate with, and whether we could use these traits to create
more homogenous groups for the study of error processing with
or without awareness. Recent studies have pointed to the effect of
individual differences in demographic characteristics (such as age
and sex), personality traits (such as absentmindedness, impulsiv-
ity, affective style, anxiety), affective and motivational variables
and behavioral performance (e.g., response speed) on error pro-
cessing (e.g., Hester et al., 2004; Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004b;
Boksem et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2010). Attention to individual
differences may be critical for advancing our understanding of the
role of the ERP components in error processing.
Can error monitoring occur without conscious recognition?
Some studies show evidence for error processing without aware-
ness. van Gaal et al. (2010) showed that behavioral conflict
adaptation can occur when the response conflict occurs without
awareness. Cohen et al. (2009) recently showed using EEG that
error monitoring can occur when subjects are not only unaware
of their errors, but also of the actual stimuli; when subjects
performed a Go/No-Go task, errors following a masked No-Go
signal elicited directional synchrony between the ACC and the
occipital cortex, akin to the synchrony found when the No-Go
signal was consciously perceived. Similarly, Ursu et al. (2009)
showed, using fMRI, that the ACC, considered to be the locus
of error processing and the origin of the Ne, was active when
subjects were presented with a response conflict of which they
were seemingly unaware (because a target’s location violates an
implicitly learned sequence), or when they made errors of which
they were unaware. In contrast, other studies suggest that aware-
ness is necessary for conflict adaptation (Kunde, 2003) or for
the activation of the ACC (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2003). Whereas
unconscious error processing may take place, the question is
at what level and what are the prerequisites for error aware-
ness to emerge. The evidence from our study, which controlled
error awareness more closely, does not support error processing
without awareness at the stage immediately after an error was
made, as indexed by the Ne. We suggest that future studies of
error awareness must address the methods used for awareness
testing.
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APPENDIX
NUMBER OF EEG SEGMENTS IN THE HIGH AND LOW
CONFIDENCE GROUPS
The High Confidence (HiC) group was comprised of the nine
subjects who had more than 20 bet 3 segments for both Aware
and Unaware Errors and less than 20 bet 1 segments for both
error types. The Low Confidence (LoC) Group was comprised of
the eight subjects who had more than 20 bet 1 segments for both
Aware and Unaware errors. Table A1 summarizes the number of
trials in each group.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSE-LOCKED WAVEFORMS AFTER
SUBTRACTING THE STIMULUS-LOCKED WAVEFORM
In the response-locked waveform, the peak-to-trough CRN
appears to be riding on a slow positive wave starting well before
the response, which creates an impression that the onset-to-
peak CRN is around the same size or even larger than the Ne
(Figure A1A). We hypothesized that the slow positivity is a resid-
ual of the jittered stimulus-locked target P3 (Figure A1C). To
investigate this hypothesis, we calculated for each subject the
mean ERP of the stimulus-locked response, separately for each
response type. Then, for each single response-locked segment
we subtracted the relevant condition’s stimulus-locked ERP, after
aligning the two waveforms according to that trial’s RT. Trials
with RTs longer than 1000ms could not be included in this
Table A1 | Mean number and range of error trials of subjects included
in the High and Low Confidence groups.
High Confidence Low Confidence
Aware Errors (all bets) 71.1 (29−118) 119.6 (55−176)
Bet 1 7.9 (0−18) 47.9 (28−73)
Bet 3 45.3 (27−70) 33.5 (2−65)
Unaware Errors (all bets) 85.6 (39−141) 110.9 (61−159)
Bet 1 15 (0−27) 59.1 (30−148)
Bet 3 48.9 (21−95) 23.3 (1−87)
procedure as the stimulus-locked grand average was not long
enough to be aligned with the response-locked ERP, resulting
in the elimination of between 2 and 31 error trials per sub-
ject. The grand average result is presented in Figure A1B, which
shows the elimination of the slow positivity, and confirms that
the CRN is in fact smaller than the Ne. Statistical analysis of the
resulting Ne amplitudes replicates the finding from the uncor-
rected waveforms reported in the Results section of the paper,
namely that the Ne for errors is significantly different from the
CRN but not different between Aware andUnaware Errors—there
was a significant effect in a one-way repeated measures ANOVA
for Response Type [F(2, 42) = 8.17, p < 0.005, ε = 0.76] which
stemmed from a difference between errors and correct responses
[t(21) = 5.27, p < 0.001], while there was no difference between
the Ne amplitude for Aware and Unaware Errors [t(21) = 1.47,
p = 0.16].
ANALYSIS OF THE CORRECT RESPONSE-LOCKED WAVEFORMS
OF THE LOW CONFIDENCE GROUP AFTER SUBTRACTING THE
STIMULUS-LOCKED WAVEFORM
In the Low Confidence group, there were enough Correct
responses with bet 1 and bet 3 for comparison within subjects
between bets. However, the response-locked grand average of the
Correct response on which subjects bet 3 seems to be riding on
a positive pre-response wave (see Figures A2A and A2C). As in
Appendix section B, we subtracted the mean of the stimulus-
locked response (separately for bet 1 and bet 3) of each subject
from each response-locked trial according to its RT. Trials with
RTs longer than 1000ms could not be included in this analysis,
resulting in the elimination of between 6 and 128 correct tri-
als per subject (this elimination did not significantly reduce the
number of single trials for each subject and bet—range after elim-
ination: 31–960). The grand average result for electrodes FCz and
Pz is shown in Figures A2B and A2D. Statistical analysis of the
resulting CRN and Pe amplitudes shows that the CRN for bet 3
was significantly smaller than the CRN for bet 1 in these sub-
jects [t(7) = 2.38, p < 0.05] but there was no difference in Pe
[t(7) = 1.01, p = 0.35].
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FIGURE A1 | Grand average waveforms at FCz of (A) the original
response-locked results, (B) the response-locked results after the
subtraction of the stimulus-locked ERPs, and (C) the stimulus-locked
waveforms. The shaded area in the stimulus-locked
waveforms represents the average reaction time ± one standard
deviation.
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FIGURE A2 | Response-locked grand average waveforms of
correct responses of the Low Confidence group. (A) The
original results at FCz; (B) the results after the subtraction of the
stimulus-locked ERPs at FCz. (C) The original results at Pz;
(D) the results after the subtraction of the stimulus-locked
ERPs at Pz.
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